Moscow's Position: Betting on Apathy
The newspaper The Guardian, citing interviews with former and current officials and intelligence data, reported that before the full-scale invasion Russia expected that only 10% of Ukrainians would resist. This claim became a key element in planning the operation and explains why the Kremlin anticipated relatively rapid establishment of control over much of the territory.
"Moscow believed that only 10% of Ukrainians would resist the invasion"
— The Guardian (based on interviews with former and current officials and intelligence representatives)
Why the 10% Estimate Was Strategically Dangerous
Even if taken literally — 10% of Ukraine amounts to roughly 4 million people. Western intelligence, according to the same report, judged that the forces Russia had assembled were insufficient to suppress such resistance. Underestimating the number of active opponents ignored not only demographics, but also the social dynamics of resistance: local networks, logistics, and the civilian population's readiness for asymmetric actions.
Another important factor was how Western services interpreted Putin's behavior: some analysts assumed his "rationality" and considered the risks a major barrier to implementing the plan. However, the decision for a full-scale invasion, the report says, was made in the first half of 2020, indicating systematic preparation despite partners' doubts.
Public Mood: Figures That Contradict Kremlin Expectations
Assessments of public sentiment after the start of the full-scale invasion confirm that reality differed from Russian assumptions. Polls by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) showed that as of 9 October 2025, 54% of Ukrainians were categorically against any territorial concessions. Another poll from 25 October found that 91% hold a negative attitude toward the Russian Federation, and 85% have a negative attitude toward its citizens.
"54% of Ukrainians are categorically against any territorial concessions"
— KMIS, survey of 9 October 2025
Consequences for Operations and Information Strategy
The error in assessing civic resilience affected logistics and the tempo of the offensive: forces designed to control a passive society were forced to adapt to widespread resistance. This, in turn, delayed plans, increased risks, and compelled a change in tactics — from rapid occupation to a prolonged operation to hold territory.
Conclusion: What This Means Today
This episode is an example of how important social factors are in modern warfare. Not only equipment and troops decide the outcome, but also a society's ability to mobilize and refuse compromises that would strip it of sovereignty. For Ukraine's partners, this is also a marker: investments in societal resilience, intelligence, and support for defensive infrastructure are not about emotions, but about practical security.
The question now is not only what happened, but whether Moscow has drawn the appropriate lessons. And whether Ukraine's partners will transform declarations of support into long-term resources that convert societal resilience into a real defense strategy?
