Brief and important
The American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine (AmCham) estimates Ukrainian farmers' losses from the 10% export duty on soy and rapeseed at around $180 mln. These are not just numbers in an abstract table: this concerns farm incomes, foreign exchange earnings and competitiveness on European markets.
What happened
In September 2025 a law introducing a 10% export duty on soy and rapeseed came into force. Official arguments: support for domestic processing, filling a special budget fund and stimulating the creation of added value in Ukraine. However, the practical effect has proven ambiguous.
Figures and distribution of losses
According to AmCham (quoted by Latifundist), farmers received about $130 mln less due to a drop in domestic prices — small and medium producers who do not export independently and depend on intermediaries were hit hardest. Another roughly $50 mln went to the state budget as duty. At the same time, foreign exchange earnings from exports over six months decreased by almost $1 bln — the biggest declines were for rapeseed (≈$400 mln), soy (≈$240 mln) and sunflower (≈$345 mln).
"Those who lobbied for this law practically pushed us out of the EU rapeseed market, because we became uncompetitive due to these export taxes"
— American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine (AmCham), 25 March
Who wins — who loses
Winners — Ukrainian oil-processing plants: they obtained raw material cheaper than export prices and increased processing volumes (LIGA.net wrote about this effect). Losers — farmers, especially those without direct access to external markets; the long-awaited shift toward processing happened quickly, but at the expense of the country's export competitiveness.
"The first production season confirmed the effectiveness — oil and meal production increased, exports of processed products rose"
— Dmytro Kyselyevskyi, Member of Parliament and one of the initiators of the changes
Why this happened — a brief analysis
The duty mechanism acts like a demand switch: exports are limited, part of the harvest remains on the domestic market and pushes down prices. This makes raw material cheaper for domestic processors, but at the same time reduces foreign exchange earnings and the market weight of our exporters in the European Union. The effect on farmers materializes immediately — they receive less for their harvest; the effect on processing can be noticeable in the short term, but does not guarantee sustainable competitiveness of the sector in the long term.
Consequences and response options
Short-term: increased domestic production of oil (according to proponents of the changes — to record volumes for rapeseed and soybean oil) and gains for processing chains. Medium- and long-term: risk of losing markets in the EU, falling foreign exchange earnings and deterioration of farms' financial condition.
The political choice now is to pay for internal reorientation with technical losses for farmers and foreign currency, or to seek balanced instruments: targeted subsidies for processors, temporary compensation for farmers, investments in logistics and export infrastructure, and phased implementation of any tariff mechanisms.
Conclusion
The duty as an instrument works, but not always as its authors expected: it can quickly create benefits for processing while undermining the export base and farmers' incomes. Now politicians have a choice — correct the instrument, make it targeted, or return to alternative mechanisms for supporting the agricultural sector. Whether they will heed the data and economic risks is a question not only for farmers, but for the entire country's economy.
Sources: American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine (AmCham), Latifundist, LIGA.net, public statements of Member of Parliament Dmytro Kyselyevskyi.
