What happened
According to Naftogaz's chairman of the board Serhii Koretsky, Russian forces over the past 24 hours shelled the company's production assets in Poltava region and carried out new massive attacks in Sumy region. According to the company, there are no casualties, but damage and destruction of equipment have been recorded.
"Over the past 24 hours the enemy again shelled our production assets in Poltava region and carried out new massive attacks in Sumy region, which are still ongoing. There are no casualties."
— Serhii Koretsky, chairman of the board of Naftogaz
The company notes that this is already the 20th attack on its facilities since the beginning of the year. Similar strikes were recorded earlier in February and January: on the night of February 8 — against facilities in Poltava region, and on January 27 — against a facility in western Ukraine, which caused a fire.
Why it matters
A one-off strike does not stop the system, but the repetition of attacks creates a cumulative effect: critical equipment is worn down, repair and logistics costs increase, and the network's reserve resilience decreases. For consumers, this could mean longer service restoration times and additional expenses in the state budget, which must finance repairs and strengthen protection of infrastructure.
Energy security experts warn: systemic strikes on production assets are not only physical damage but also an attempt to undermine fuel supply logistics and create additional pressure during periods of heightened demand.
Context of the attacks
Russian strikes on energy infrastructure have been repeated since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Naftogaz is one of the key operators on which gas supply for enterprises and critical facilities depends. Therefore, its assets often become targets as part of a strategy to weaken Ukrainian infrastructure.
- Night of February 8: attack on Naftogaz facilities in Poltava region — no casualties, but damage to equipment.
- January 27: shelling of one of the facilities in western Ukraine, which led to a fire.
What next
The course of action is clear: emergency repairs, risk inventories, strengthening physical security of facilities, and diversifying supply routes. However, their implementation requires financial resources and rapid coordination with partners. Now it's up to the state and international donors: will there be enough resources not only to patch up the consequences but also to increase the system's resilience for good?
