What happened
According to LIGA.net, spokesman for the Southern Defense Forces Vladyslav Voloshyn reported an uptick in an enemy tactic — small assault teams infiltrate into the rear, hoist Russian flags and take photo or video recordings to create the illusion of a deep advance. This practice is being recorded not only near Huliaipole but across the entire area of responsibility of the Southern Defense Forces.
"They infiltrate as far as possible into our rear, unfurl their flag to take photo or video recordings, as if Russian troops have advanced far and taken new territory under their control"
— Vladyslav Voloshyn, spokesman for the Southern Defense Forces
Why the Russians want these "flag" photos
The aim is informational rather than a sustainable tactical gain: such footage shows foreign analysts, the OSINT community and their own command a quick "result." According to Voloshyn, it is on the basis of such images that senior officers are held to account by higher leadership — and even report the "capture" of settlements, regardless of the real situation on the ground.
The General Staff of Ukraine has already refuted some claims about the "capture" of Huliaipole; facts on the ground indicate ongoing street fighting and the presence of Ukrainian positions, particularly in the western part of the town.
What this means for the front
Voloshyn explains that such groups usually "do not live long": the enemy enters, makes drone shots, and within a short time loses those forces as a result of Ukrainian units' actions. In other words, this does not produce a real strategic breakthrough, but it creates an informational backdrop that can distort the picture of events for an external observer.
"Although these Russian assault groups do not last long – they infiltrate into our rear, are photographed by drone, and then are almost immediately destroyed."
— Vladyslav Voloshyn, spokesman for the Southern Defense Forces
Context for partners and analysts
OSINT analysts and Western observers are already pointing out: visual confirmations require verification of context — the time of recording, geolocation, and evidence of active fighting. For international partners, such "flag" photos can create a false impression of the dynamics of the battles if they are not cross-checked with data from headquarters and independent sources.
Conclusion
This tactic is an example of how information warfare operates alongside combat: instead of real territorial control, the enemy invests in images meant to make others believe in its "successes." For Ukrainian defenders the key is to shift partners' attention from pictures to verified data and to results on the positions. While street fighting continues in Huliaipole and Stepnohirsk, it is facts, not impressive images, that will determine the course of events. Whether the international community can filter propaganda from reality is a question on which both strategic support and international perception of the campaign's progress depend.
