In May 2025, American intelligence agencies warned Poland several times that Russia could organize an armed provocation on its territory or near its borders within just a few months. This was reported by the Polish publication Onet, citing sources close to Polish President Karol Nawrocki. Washington did not name a specific date, but "systematically informed Warsaw of increasingly new Russian plans," according to the same sources.
What exactly is the Kremlin considering
Among the specific scenarios are drone or missile strikes on critical infrastructure, particularly energy facilities, simulation of an air strike that would force Poland to activate air defenses, or a small ground invasion from Kaliningrad or Belarus. Polish intelligence services, according to The Telegraph, do not rule out an "accidental" crossing of the border by Russian or Belarusian military personnel — with subsequent explanation citing GPS malfunction or a rescue operation.
There is already a precedent: in September 2024, 19 Russian drones entered Polish airspace — the largest violation since the start of the full-scale war. Warsaw then activated Article 4 of the NATO Charter (consultations), but not Article 5 (collective defense). Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski called this a probing of the Alliance's defenses.
Why would Russia do this — if not to win
Political analyst Dmytro Levus explained the logic in a comment to UNN: the main goal of the provocation is not a military result, but division.
The Kremlin needs to destroy Western unity, demonstrate NATO's weakness, and force European countries to reconsider their support for Ukraine.
Dmytro Levus, political analyst
This mechanism has been tested since 2014: Russia does not attempt to achieve a classic victory over NATO — it tests where the Alliance is indecisive. The September drone incident showed: between "condemned" and "responded" — there is a chasm. This is exactly where the Kremlin is aiming.
NATO between resolve and restraint
After the August incidents, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that the Alliance would "use all means to protect airspace," but clarified: the decision to destroy a suspect object would depend on "available intelligence regarding the threat, intentions, weapons, and risk to civilians." Polish Prime Minister Tusk publicly stated that he would shoot down violators "without discussion." Rutte softened that same response. This public disagreement between allies is exactly the signal Moscow reads as an invitation to the next step.
- Kaliningrad and Belarus — two staging grounds for a ground scenario without a declaration of war
- Article 4 vs Article 5 — Poland already chose the softer option in 2024, and Russia noted this
- Hybrid attack — cyber + disinformation + drones simultaneously complicate attribution and slow down the decision to respond
The key practical conclusion: a provocation does not have to be large to be effective. A single incident after which allies publicly disagree in their assessments is enough for the Kremlin to achieve its goal without a single tank on Polish soil.
If the next incident again ends with Article 4 instead of Article 5 — will Moscow have any reason to stop at drones?
