Main points
President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine can produce up to 1,000 drone interceptors per day, but there is currently a shortage of operators and corresponding mobile units. This creates a new bottleneck: technical capacity is growing faster than the human and organizational resources needed to use it.
What the president said
"As for the 'coalition of the willing,' it will act as a guarantor of security only after the war ends, only after a ceasefire. So while 'Shaheds' are flying at us and the war has not ended, we cannot count on their help. Only within the framework of our bilateral partnership agreements."
— Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine
"They want up to 1,000 now. We'll see. I see so far an average of 350 — that's their capability."
— Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine
"But that's not enough. Our interceptors have already outpaced the number of our operators. So now we must catch up with the number of interceptor groups, the corresponding mobile units."
— Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine
Numbers and context
According to the president, Russia sought to reach a figure of about 1,000 strike UAVs ("Shaheds") per day, but so far the daily average intensity is around 350 units (previously 200–250). An important technical calculation: there should be at least two interceptors per attacking drone. Therefore, in the case of 1,000 attacks, roughly 2,000 interceptors would need to be deployed daily — far more than are currently available not only in equipment but also in operators and mobile units.
Implications for the front
A fragmented but strong production line is an advantage, but without proportional increases in personnel and logistics it remains incomplete. What is needed are not just machines on a conveyor, but fast, trained units that can deploy interceptors, coordinate them and provide technical support in field conditions.
What experts say
Analysts at Defense Express note that the intensification of attacks (an increase in the number of drones and the personnel that services them) happens sequentially: technological accumulation is accompanied by an increase in human resources. Also, in December and January official reports from command indicated a growth in Russian UAV personnel and plans to significantly expand such units in 2026.
What to do next
A short list of priorities that follow from the current situation:
- Speed up the training of operators and the creation of mobile units — hands-on training and simulators can reduce time requirements.
- Invest in automation of control and identification — so that each operator can more effectively manage more platforms.
- Coordinate financing and supplies with partners — Zelensky emphasized the role of bilateral agreements in the current circumstances.
- Plan logistics not only for production but also for deployment — warehouses, transport, and technical maintenance in the combat zone.
In view of this, Ukraine's technical advantage is a real resource, but its effectiveness depends on people and the systems that support them. Whether we can increase not only the number of interceptors but also the number of trained, coordinated forces to employ them in time is a question that will determine the resilience of air defense in the coming months.
