President Volodymyr Zelensky's decree implementing the decision of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) appears technical on the surface. But behind the list of ten companies lies a specific architecture of information control that Russia has been building on occupied territories for years.
Who is on the list and why
The Presidential Office disclosed four key names. "Luhansk Communications" and "Mobile Communication Systems" are regional operators that, according to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia uses to spread its narratives and disinformation about the situation in Ukraine. "Amtel-Svyaz" is a federal satellite and telecommunications operator that provides direct communication for Russian occupation authorities. "Cosmic Communications" is an enterprise that provides secure channels for conducting military operations against Ukraine.
The remaining six companies on the list are not officially named, but the Presidential Office describes their functions uniformly: providing internet access for "entities serving Russia," broadcasting Russian television channels in occupied territories.
Why this is more than just telecom
"Living under Russian occupation is not just a military reality—it is an information siege. Between 5 and 6 million Ukrainians in temporarily occupied territories are cut off from Ukrainian media, flooded with Kremlin propaganda, forced to live under disconnections and messenger bans."
EUvsDisinfo, analysis of Russian information strategy in occupied territories
This is not a side effect of occupation—it is a documented strategy. After 2022, Russia has systematically replaced Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure with its own. In Crimea and parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, massive failures of Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram have been recorded since August–September 2025—even through VPN. In parallel, the state messenger MAX is being promoted, which, according to EUvsDisinfo, gained 75 million users in half a year and collects extensive tracking data.
In other words, sanctioned companies are not simply business ventures on occupied lands. They are parts of a single mechanism: cut off from Ukrainian signals, connect to Russian ones, make it impossible to verify information from outside.
What sanctions achieve in practice
Formally, the sanctions decree blocks assets, prohibits transactions, and restricts company activities within Ukrainian jurisdiction. But the companies themselves physically operate in occupied territory—beyond the reach of Ukrainian law.
The real weight of the decision lies in what happens next. The Presidential Office announced that it will transmit information about all sanctioned companies to international partners and initiate synchronized sanctions across other jurisdictions. This is a standard but principled detail: if the EU or USA duplicate the restrictions, companies lose access to international financial instruments, equipment, and software that could still arrive through third countries.
- Ukraine has already appealed to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) demanding that Russia be held accountable for the illegal use of Ukrainian telecommunications resources and telephone codes in occupied territories.
- In parallel with the telecom sanctions, Zelensky signed sanctions against companies involved in Russia's military-industrial complex—meaning this current package fits into systematic rather than one-off logic.
The limits of effectiveness
The question that remains open is: will Ukraine be able to convince the EU and USA to include these telecommunications companies in their own sanctions registers—and if so, how quickly? Without this step, the NSDC decision establishes a position but does not change the occupation's communications infrastructure. If synchronization occurs—"Amtel-Svyaz" and "Cosmic Communications" could lose access to Western technologies, without which servicing satellite networks becomes significantly more difficult.
