When the Rada approved Yuliia Svyrydenko's government, two categories of people ended up at the Cabinet table: those who already had experience managing a ministry, and those for whom this appointment is their first in life. The difference is not cosmetic: the speed of decisions in a critical moment depends on whether a minister understands how the bureaucratic machine works from the inside.
Who stayed
Among those who retained their positions are several key figures from Shmyhal's government. They have already gone through at least one full cycle of military budgeting, know coalition partners, and have established communication channels with donors. For them, the transition is a change of prime minister, not a change in the logic of work.
Who came for the first time
Newcomers are a different story. Some of them have solid experience in the private sector or in deputy positions, but have never borne political responsibility for an entire ministry. This means: in the first months, they will spend time understanding how the apparatus actually works—regardless of what is written in the job description.
An illustrative example is ministers who came from business or analytical structures. They can formulate the right goals, but the first serious test is not strategy, but the first crisis that requires a decision in 48 hours without complete information.
Why this matters now
Ukraine is negotiating EU membership, implementing major privatization, and simultaneously managing a war economy. In this context, a novice minister is not a problem in itself: many reformers came without experience and achieved results. The problem arises when a newcomer does not have a strong team of deputies and is not ready to delegate what he or she does not yet know.
The test will not come in strategy presentations, but in the first round of negotiations with the IMF or the first major infrastructure accident that falls within their ministry's purview.
The question is not whether newcomers will cope—most will adapt. The question is different: does Svyrydenko's government have a mechanism that reduces the cost of mistakes in the first hundred days, when the cost of each decision is measured not by ratings, but by real consequences for people?
