What happened
According to LIGA.net and two sources in the intelligence community, former head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak in 2025 attempted at least five times to remove Kyrylo Budanov from the post of head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) of the Ministry of Defense. These attempts were unsuccessful — the sources link this to the practical effectiveness of the intelligence chief in frontline operations.
“Very often, when at the High Command the president asks whether Kyrylo Oleksiyovych can do something, the answer is: ‘Of course, Mr. Supreme Commander.’ And then — we just take it and do it.”
— one of the sources in the intelligence community
Reasons for the conflict
Sources identify three key sources of tension:
→ Incompatibility of data and communication channels. Budanov often provided the president with information that differed from the predictions of the Chief of the General Staff, and he had direct access to the head of state without coordination with the Office of the President.
→ Fight for control over the Deep Strike direction. Yermak’s team reportedly tried to monopolize the setting of targets and the mechanics of strikes on Russian territory, while the GUR defended its autonomy in tactical and operational decision-making for these tasks.
→ Contacts in the global arms market. The procurement system and established links with international suppliers are a closed and specific environment that various influence groups also sought to claim.
Context and chronology
On 28 November 2025 the National Anti-Corruption Bureau conducted searches at the former head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak — the FT links this to the “Midas” case, which concerns corruption in the energy sector. On the same day Yermak resigned, and the president accepted his resignation. On 2 January 2026 Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree appointing Kyrylo Budanov head of the Office of the President.
Consequences for security and trust
This story matters not as an internal scandal, but as an indicator of how powers are distributed during wartime. In short:
— Intelligence autonomy directly affects the operational speed and accuracy of strikes; forced centralization risks slowing decisions and diluting responsibility.
— Supply systems and contacts with foreign suppliers are a critical resource. Conflicts around them can create vulnerabilities for logistics and the quality of armaments.
— Partners and allies are watching not the personalities, but whether Ukrainian authorities retain the ability to make quick, measured decisions. Transparency of investigations and stability of leadership decisions are factors that affect trust and continued support.
Brief conclusion
Information from LIGA.net and mentions in the FT reveal more than personnel quarrels: this is about the balance between civilian control, operational autonomy of intelligence, and the effectiveness of combat operations. The coming months will show whether these internal clashes turn into systemic changes that will either strengthen or, conversely, weaken Ukraine’s defensive potential — and this issue concerns not only politicians, but everyone interested in the country’s security.
