Ukrainian Resistance
"The Ukrainian resistance and its historical significance" — it is not excluded that books and dissertations will be written on this topic, authoritative experts will argue, serious studies will be conducted, and the consequences of the Ukrainian resistance will be felt around the world for a very long time. Just as, for example, the consequences of the Great French Revolution — they are not only still felt, but remain with us to this day, and it seems, forever.
Despite the complexity and multilayered nature of the phenomenon itself, the essence of the Ukrainian resistance is very simple. It is that we simply do not want to disappear. And this is despite the fact that the disappearance of Ukraine as an independent national and cultural-political actor from that almost unfathomably complex geopolitical chessboard of the world would suit many.
Why it would be easier for everyone without Ukraine
The Russian Federation
The demands that the Russian Federation makes for "making peace" are, in fact, the first stage of a plan to remove Ukraine from the chessboard, or to "unfriendlyly absorb" Ukraine into the Moscow swamp. This is precisely what the Kremlin seeks, this is where it has staked everything (practically all‑in, as in poker) — and this is the stake across the board: in war, in politics, in the economy. The reasons for this manic desire to "absorb Ukraine" are the subject of separate studies, including in the field of collective psychopathology (see another article on our site). But, one way or another, the disappearance of Ukraine as such is Moscow's main strategic priority.
United States
For the United States, a world without Ukraine is just back to normal — a return to a norm where it is convenient to make deals, conclude agreements, and conduct business as usual. Despite declared adherence to democratic values, note: conducting business with backward repressive autocracies is a very convenient practice for the U.S. Important issues are resolved in a few offices, and often in just one; and one can ignore the obscure realities and movements in the rebellious provinces and colonies of Moscow that now, for some reason, must be taken into account. And, of course, when it comes to the dilemma — spend on aid to Ukraine or profit from the restoration of business with the Muscovites — the short-sighted pragmatism of the American establishment and business elites does not play in Ukraine’s favor.
Europe
Politically, it is an extremely heterogeneous continent. There are Western European nations whose mental map places Siberia roughly where the western border of the USSR once was. Quite often representatives of these nations sincerely wonder: why on earth does Ukraine want to join NATO, didn't that desire cause the war, why won't Kyiv negotiate with Moscow, etc. The mere existence of Ukraine is in many ways perceived there as a factor of instability that creates unacceptable security and financial risks for the whole continent.
Of course, there are European nations among which a different view predominates. In such countries the Moscow threat is well understood, and in some cases they have bitterly experienced Moscow’s domination. But even for such countries, supporting Ukraine is increasingly becoming a heavy burden, and public opinion more and more often ponders that while Ukraine fights (and it is unclear how long it will hold out), they need to invest more in their own defense capability and look for ways to "appease" or even "satisfy" Moscow — of course, at Ukraine’s expense. Yet even among these there are countries with a clear pro‑Moscow orientation, which is generally quite an unnatural phenomenon, since it directly contradicts the historical experience of those nations.
According to many honest opinion leaders in Eastern European countries, the level of bribery of politicians and spending on pro‑Moscow propaganda is simply incredible. Just look at Fico and Orbán, their political entourage and pocket media. But even in the United Kingdom there have been official revelations of pro‑Moscow political bribery. It should also be borne in mind that Moscow spends absurd amounts of money on promoting adventurous right‑ and left‑wing political projects with the aim of forming a Moscow‑centric European consensus.
And although such a consensus does not yet exist and is unlikely ever to form, the threat should not be underestimated. After all, this concerns a change in the pan‑European paradigm desired by Moscow: Moscow wants Ukraine in Europe to be perceived not even as a "fence", but as a "burden" — and then it will be much easier for Moscow to achieve its goal of absorbing Ukraine.
China
It is obvious that Beijing does not want a quick Russian victory in the war against Ukraine. If it did, Moscow would be receiving different support and different supplies. Therefore Beijing supports Moscow semi‑covertly, and to a significant extent — through its North Korean proxies. A quick Russian victory would mean a strengthening of Russia, which would become a serious obstacle for Beijing on its dreamed path to gaining full control over some 7 million square kilometers and the corresponding resources of Siberia and the Far East. It was precisely such figures and theses that began to appear in China’s central media in December 2025, which is also quite telling.
So Beijing’s calculation is fairly simple and cynical: maximize the weakening of Russia through a long war. Therefore, for the PRC Ukraine is only a factor that weakens Moscow and distracts the "collective West" from the geopolitical threats that Beijing itself can and apparently plans to generate.
The rest of the world
One can and should analyze foreign‑policy approaches in relation to the "geopolitical weight" of other countries. But even despite sometimes significant public sympathies for Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression, the rest of the world generally has virtually no direct interest in Ukraine holding on. Often, on the contrary, many around the world are interested in an as‑soon‑as‑possible end to the war (obviously, at Ukraine's expense) and the resumption of business with Russia.
The positions of countries like the DPRK, Iran, or Cuba were determined long ago, and one should not expect any shift toward friendliness to Ukraine from them. As for nations dependent on supplies of Ukrainian grain — it seems that what matters to them is only that the grain be delivered, and they are frankly indifferent to whether that grain will have been stolen by Russians or not. Moreover, the reduction of "humanitarian" programs to support poor countries due to the need for military assistance to Ukraine, which some European countries recently announced, also does not win Ukraine many sympathizers among "developing countries" (although in reality they are not very developing, but that is another topic).
Global perspective
Globally, the deeper Ukraine sinks into economic decay — into energy, demographic, security, corruption and all kinds of other crises — the less interesting it becomes to the world. Investment, tourism, economic cooperation — all of that for now is unfortunately not about Ukraine. And, in fact, that is exactly what Moscow is counting on.
It must be acknowledged — around the world there are more and more supporters of "peace" on Moscow's terms, achieved through concessions to Moscow and at the cost of "surrendering" Ukraine. Moscow actively supports and directly finances such a paradigm shift. And that means that the prospects for further flows of the urgently needed financial and military‑technical aid to Ukraine, and even political‑diplomatic support, are becoming increasingly problematic. Of course, corruption scandals of the Ukrainian authorities only make the situation worse. But there is one "but".
Why the Ukrainian resistance both has a chance and gives a chance
Ukrainians — at least the conscious and active part of the Ukrainian nation — do not want to disappear. A significant part of our society lives with the awareness that we must not give up, that we cannot trust any security guarantees, that we cannot count on Moscow honoring any promises or agreements. We have learned to believe that our enemies will perish like dew in the sun only if we kill them, and not before.
Of course, there are cowards, draft‑dodgers, capitulators, potential collaborators and the "wait‑and‑sees". But they are not the ones, at least for now, shaping events in Ukraine. Ukrainians are skeptical about the idea of a "quick peace" because they desperately do not want to vanish. The desperation of this stubbornness gives Ukraine a chance. But not only Ukraine. It seems it gives the whole world a chance as well.
The world has sunk into short‑sighted, primitive pragmatism and is forgetting values. It has become fixated on interests and shady deals, and forgets about unfinished business. This has happened many times in human history, and each time such deviations proved very costly. And each time there were healthy forces that brought people back to an awareness of what really matters, centered around a core concept: freedom.
Freedom is what is worth dying for and killing enemies for. The modern world has somewhat forgotten this. So we are here to remind it. At this stage of human development Ukraine is destined to become a bifurcation point. Here and now the Ukrainian resistance, which continues despite adverse circumstances, is forming a new world‑historical perspective — because it determines what the world of the future will be.
