When on December 3, 2025, the EU Council and European Parliament agreed on a mechanism for phasing out Russian gas, a single paragraph about oil appeared in the final document. According to the EU Council, the European Commission recorded an intention to submit a legislative proposal on phasing out imports of Russian oil — but no earlier than the end of 2027. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this was not enough.
What the Baltic countries are demanding
At a meeting of EU energy ministers on Friday, the three Baltic countries called on the European Commission to accelerate and propose a specific mechanism for phasing out Russian oil as soon as possible, Financial Times reported citing several sources familiar with the negotiations. MEP Ville Niinistö, lead rapporteur of the European Parliament's Committee on Industry, spoke directly: "Now we must without delay turn our attention to oil imports — and hold the Commission to its promise to submit a proposal in early 2026."
The logic of the Baltic position is clear: the gas deal covers an intention to limit oil, but establishes no legally binding timeline or control mechanism.
A hole the size of Hungary
Even the adopted gas regulation contains a substantial exemption. As Euronews reports, Hungary and Slovakia received exemptions from the pipeline gas ban based on supply security arguments. In the case of oil, the situation is even more acute: according to the CREA analytical center, oil import volumes to Hungary and Slovakia in 2024 were 2% higher than before the invasion in 2021 — and the current exemption has no clear end date.
"Hungarian MOL benefited fully from cheap Russian raw materials without passing any savings on to consumers. The company's operating income rose 30% compared to pre-war levels."
Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), May 2025
Is there real economic pressure on Moscow
The argument of ban supporters — that Russia is already feeling pressure — is partly confirmed by data. According to calculations by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, the share of oil and gas revenues in Russia's federal budget fell to 23% in 2025 — the lowest level in the past twenty years. In November 2025, oil and gas revenues declined by 34% year-on-year, to 530 billion rubles.
But there is a caveat. As the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies notes, the collapse in oil revenues is compensated by growth in VAT and profit tax — meaning the Kremlin has shifted the financing of war onto the shoulders of its own business and households. The budget balances, but prices within the country are rising. Janis Kluge from Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin) notes that pressure on the federal budget is mounting — but does not describe it as critical in the short term.
This is the bottleneck of the Baltic initiative: economic pressure through oil will work only as a systemic and universal measure — not as a declaration with a postponement until 2027 and a hole in the form of the "Druzhba" pipeline.
If the European Commission truly submits a proposal in early 2026, the key test will be one question: will it contain a mechanism that closes the Hungarian-Slovak exemption, — or will there again appear wording "taking into account supply security" without a completion date?
