Imagine a situation: a person is found guilty, sent to prison, but legally remains a member of the supervisory board of a state bank. Not because someone forgot about it, but because the law does not provide a clear mechanism for dismissal. It was precisely this conflict that Deputy Minister of Finance Yuri Draganchuk publicly acknowledged — and called it "just awful from the shareholder's perspective."
This concerns Article 7 of the law on banks and banking activities, which defines an exhaustive list of grounds for early termination of the powers of supervisory board members. The list is so narrow that the state as the owner of the bank essentially lacks a simple lever of influence over its appointees if they have not submitted a resignation, died, or fallen into one of the clearly prescribed scenarios.
How the state tries to dismiss a person by circumventing the law
A notable case is that of Mykola Hladyshenko, a participant in the "Forrest Gump" case, who was a member of the supervisory board of Sense Bank. To remove him from office, the government had to resort to workarounds — through a procedure recognizing non-compliance with qualification requirements regarding independence, which was adopted by the National Bank committee on August 19. Direct dismissal "by fact" did not resolve the situation.
That is, instead of a simple decision by the owner — to dismiss a person whose actions harm the bank's reputation and interests — it was necessary to construct a separate legal basis through the regulator. On August 31, Gerhard Büsch, former head of PrivatBank's board of directors, took Hladyshenko's place.
What the Ministry of Finance proposes to change
According to Draganchuk, the ministry has already begun consultations with international partners about expanding Article 7. The idea is to give the shareholder (i.e., the state) a direct authority to dismiss a supervisory board member in cases not currently provided for by law: for example, when a person is convicted but formally remains able to "perform their duties" remotely.
"The shareholder's hands are tied," the deputy minister stated.
The logic sounds convincing: why should the state, which owns the bank, have to go through complex procedural labyrinths to get rid of a person who is already under investigation or convicted by court? But here another question arises — the very same one that Article 7 was once written so strictly to address.
Why these restrictions exist in the first place
The narrow list of grounds for dismissing supervisory board members of state banks is neither accidental nor a bureaucratic error. It is one of the tools to protect the independence of supervisory bodies from political pressure. If a minister or government can dismiss board members without clear formal grounds, there is a temptation to use this lever not against corrupt officials, but against inconvenient, principled directors who block dubious management decisions or political interference in credit policy.
The international partners with whom the Ministry of Finance is now consulting are precisely those who once insisted on strict Article 7 as a condition of trust in corporate governance of state banks. Therefore, the discussion is unlikely to be quick: the issue is not whether the shareholder needs more authority, but how to grant it without opening the door to the return of manual control of state banks through supervisory boards.
If balance between flexibility and independence is not found in the near future, the risk remains — to leave the system in its current state: when even a convicted person can formally remain on the supervisory board of a bank owned by the state for years.
