Ninety-seven percent. This is the figure for interception of Russian FPV drones of the "Molniya" type cited by Yaroslav Hryshin, co-founder of the Ukrainian anti-drone system manufacturer "General Chereshnya". According to him, modern electronic warfare systems developed in Ukraine make it possible to neutralize the vast majority of these attack drones before they reach their targets.
"Molniyas" are one of the mass tools of Russian FPV attack tactics. They are cheap, fast, and produced in large quantities. The logic of their use is simple: if even part of them get through, that's already a result. This is precisely why an interception rate of over 95% is fundamentally important: it destroys the very mathematics of mass deployment.
Hryshin explains the advantage not only by the jamming technology itself but also by the speed of adaptation. The Russians regularly change drone control frequencies and protocols—a standard tactic in electronic warfare. The response of "General Chereshnya", according to him, lies in systems capable of analyzing and blocking new signal signatures much faster than the enemy can implement them on a mass scale.
This is where the real friction in this story lies. 97% is a metric in specific conditions, against a specific drone modification, in a specific tactical scenario. Anti-drone effectiveness depends catastrophically on terrain, building density, distance, and whether the system is actually enabled at the right moment. No EW manufacturer in the world provides these figures with independent verified audits—and Hryshin is no exception.
At the same time, the very fact that Ukrainian private companies are producing and improving EW systems in combat conditions represents a structural advantage that did not exist in 2022. The cycle from detecting a new threat to updating the system's software has been reduced from months to weeks or days. State defense enterprises typically don't operate this way.
The question that remains open is: if Ukrainian EW systems truly intercept almost all "Molniyas"—why are FPV attacks still one of the main causes of equipment and personnel losses on the front, and when will independent verification of these metrics from real combat use appear?
