What it's about
Bloomberg reports that a number of European capitals are holding secret talks about the possibility of creating their own nuclear deterrent. According to the agency, the talks are taking place at the level of military and government officials and were triggered by a crisis of confidence in Washington after the temporary halt to the sharing of combat intelligence with Ukraine in spring 2025.
"The results were immediate: Ukraine suffered setbacks on the battlefield, which its European allies watched in horror"
— Bloomberg, interlocutors familiar with the matter
Who's at the center of the discussion
At present, Europe's nuclear potential is formally concentrated in the United Kingdom and France. It is estimated that these two countries spend about $12 billion a year maintaining their nuclear triads and are already discussing coordination of these forces. Sources say French President Emmanuel Macron may raise the issue of a clearer offer of a nuclear umbrella at the Munich Security Conference.
Why this is happening now
The key trigger was the loss of operational trust at a critical moment. When a partner with significant nuclear capability temporarily restricts intelligence sharing, allies reassess how much they can rely on an external security guarantee. This is a rational decision from a risk-minimization perspective, but it has technical and political limits.
What partner institutions are saying
"The U.S. continues to extend its nuclear deterrence to its allies"
— Representative of the U.S. Department of Defense (comment in response to a Bloomberg request)
Implications for Ukraine
For us, the key question is not whether Europe will be affected by this development, but whether it will strengthen Europe's ability to deter Russia and to support Ukraine by the usual means. Possible effects:
• Positive: strengthened coordination of defense policies within the EU/NATO could accelerate deliveries of precision weapons, logistics, and intelligence.
• Negative: debate over nuclear autonomy raises risks to the non‑proliferation regime and could divert resources from urgent support to Ukraine.
What is realistically possible
Building a full-fledged nuclear infrastructure takes decades, billions of dollars, and political decisions with international consequences. Less radical options include coordination of existing nuclear arsenals, expanded mechanisms for a nuclear umbrella, or formal agreements on shared responsibility — these are technically faster but require political will and trust between capitals.
Conclusion
These talks are an indicator of a broader process: Europe wants more predictable security. For Ukraine, this is a chance to obtain from partners not only declarations, but concrete protection mechanisms and rapid battlefield assistance. The question remains open: will European concern turn into investments and real guarantees that strengthen our defense today, rather than abstract options for tomorrow?
