When Donald Trump and Narendra Modi announced a preliminary trade agreement in February 2025, the question of Russian oil seemed settled. Washington was removing an additional 25-percent tariff, New Delhi was committing to stop purchases from Moscow. But between a commitment and a mechanism for enforcing it lies a gap that Congress is now trying to fill unilaterally.
What the bill changes
The bipartisan Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 (S.1241) provides for tariffs up to 100% on goods from the five largest buyers of Russian oil. According to analysts at Kpler, this list includes China, India, Slovakia, Hungary, and Azerbaijan. The original version of the bill provided for tariffs up to 500% — later, senators Richard Blumenthal and Roger Wicker lowered the bar by half after coordination with the Trump administration.
According to Bloomberg, Indian officials viewed the bill's appearance as a surprise — since the issue of oil purchases was already considered closed within the framework of February negotiations. The problem is that the White House and Congress are acting in parallel, not in coordination.
"China and India together consume over 80% of Russia's maritime crude oil exports"
Analysts cited by Bloomberg
What India actually did — and what it didn't
After the February agreements, India is indeed cutting purchases. According to Kpler, in December 2025, Russian oil deliveries fell to approximately 1.1 million barrels per day — the lowest level since November 2022. Compared to 1.77 million barrels in November — nearly a third of the market disappeared in a month. Mangalore Refinery did not purchase a single barrel from Russia for the first time since September 2022.
But the main trade agreement between the US and India has not yet been signed. After the US Supreme Court struck down Trump's presidential tariffs, negotiations hit a dead end: New Delhi is expecting more favorable terms, Washington is expecting actual supplies of American and Venezuelan oil instead of Russian.
New Delhi's silent response
Bloomberg sources describe India's position as deliberately restrained: there will be no public criticism of the bill. New Delhi views the current tension as a "transitional stage" in broader relations with the US and counts on continued negotiations. This is classic Indian diplomacy — maximum flexibility with minimum commitment.
- February agreement: verbal commitment, without verification mechanism
- Senate bill: automatic tariffs — regardless of negotiation status
- Supreme Court struck down presidential tariffs — legal basis is unstable
- India is cutting purchases, but the pace remains at New Delhi's discretion
The conflict here is not between the US and India — but between two American institutions: the White House, which negotiates bilaterally, and Congress, which wants to fix pressure legislatively, outside any diplomatic agreements.
If the Sanctioning Russia Act passes the Senate and takes effect, India will face a choice: fulfill the February promise in full and receive an exception — or become a target of tariffs, even despite the existence of an agreement with the president. The question is whether the senators are willing to provide a mechanism for exemption for countries that have already concluded bilateral agreements with the White House — and whether the Trump administration will want to defend it.
